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ADDRESSES
THE MURDER OF FATHER JAMES COYLE, THE
PROSECUTION OF EDWIN STEPHENSON, AND
THE TRUE CALLING OF LAWYERS
WILLIAM H. PRYOR JR.*
More than eighty years ago, in Birmingham, Alabama, there
was an infamous murder and prosecution that involved a tal-
ented defense lawyer who would later rise to the highest levels of
law and politics. This historical event is a sordid story of religious
and racial bigotry and the once formidable power of the Ku Klux
Klan. This event has been studied by several historians' and by a
law student in a recent comment in the Alabama Law Review.
2
This story raises substantial questions about legal strategy, profes-
sional ethics, and morality.
I will discuss several aspects of this story. I will first address
the murder and the events leading to the murder. I will then
describe the lawyers and the criminal trial. I will address the
later fame of the lead defense lawyer and a few lessons from this
history regarding the calling of lawyers. I will end by addressing
recent criticisms of my perspective that were published last year
* CircuitJudge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
On January 24, 2006, Judge Pryor delivered a version of this Address to the
Notre Dame Law School's student chapter of the Federalist Society for Law &
Public Policy Studies. He is grateful to Dean Sharon Davies, Professor Glenn
Feldman, and Professor Michael DeBow for their review and helpful comments
about an earlier draft of this Address.
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by a biographer of the defense lawyer and why I reject his
criticisms.
I. THE MURDER OF FATHER JAMES COYLE
In 1921, Birmingham, a relatively young city, fifty years old,
was already the primary urban community in Alabama.3 Bir-
mingham was comparable in size to Atlanta and boasted the tall-
est skyscrapers in the South.4 It was also booming in population
and economic growth.5
It was, of course, a city of racial segregation with the highest
composition of black residents (38.2 percent) of any major
American city,6 but bigotry in Birmingham was not only a matter
of race. According to the most authoritative history of Alabama,
"[b]y 1920 anti-Catholicism was rampant, and the Ku Klux Klan
exercised tremendous influence."7  Charles Sweeney of The
Nation magazine wrote that Birmingham was "the American hot-
bed of anti-Catholic fanaticism."8
On the evening of August 11, 1921, Father James Coyle, a
Catholic priest and the pastor of seventeen years of St. Paul's
Church in Birmingham, was on the front porch of the rectory
reading his breviary,9 a collection of prayers and Scripture
recited throughout every day by all priests, religious, and many
other Catholics. A Methodist minister named Edwin Stephenson
approached Father Coyle.' ° Stephenson fired three shots of a
pistol at Father Coyle and killed him.1"
Although both were ministers, Coyle and Stephenson led
different lives. A native of Ireland, James Edwin Coyle was
ordained in Rome in 1896, at the age of twenty-three, and began
his work as a priest in Mobile, first in parish missions and then at
McGill Institute for Boys as a teacher and later rector.' 2 In 1904,
after the untimely death of his predecessor, Father O'Reilly,
Father Coyle was appointed by the Bishop of Mobile as the pastor




7. Id. at 448; see also Surrrs, supra note 1, at 333-34.
8. Charles P. Sweeney, Bigotry Turns to Murder, THE NATION, Aug. 31,
1921, at 232.
9. NEwMAN, supra note 1, at 72.
10. Id. at 73.
11. Id.; see also Surrrs, supra note 1, at 337, 339-40.
12. St. Paul's Cathedral to Celebrate 100th Anniversary of Fr. James Edwin
Coyle's Arrival in Birmingham, THE CATHOLIC WEEK, Nov. 19, 2004, at 12; see also
JOHN WRIGHT JR., THE FATHER JAMES E. COYLE MEMORIAL PROJECT, http://
www.fathercoyle.org (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
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of St. Paul. Father Coyle was a poet and prolific writer who often
defended the Catholic Church and his native Ireland in letters to
the editors of the newspapers in Birmingham.' Stephenson was
a former barber whose "church" was the Jefferson County Court-
house,' 4 which was next door to the St. Paul rectory. Stephen-
son's ministry was to perform wedding ceremonies and assist
couples in obtaining marriage licenses.15 He was called the "mar-
rying parson."' 6 Stephenson also hated Catholics and was a
member of the Ku Klux Klan.
17
The intersection of their lives involved Stephenson's only
daughter, Ruth. On the day of Coyle's murder, Coyle had served
as priest for the marriage of Ruth and Pedro Gussman, a Puerto
Rican. 8 "Stephenson had long been having trouble with the lit-
erarily-inclined Ruth,"19 and several months earlier, Ruth had
informed Stephenson that she had become a Catholic,20 and a
member of Our Lady of Sorrows parish.2" When Ruth disap-
peared on August 11, Stephenson first tried to obtain a search
warrant for the rectory of St. Paul, but could not find a judge, so
Stephenson went home and retrieved his pistol.22 When Ste-
phenson arrived at the rectory, he asked Father Coyle about the
whereabouts of Ruth, and Coyle informed Stephenson that Coyle
had that afternoon presided at Ruth's marriage.23 Stephenson
said Coyle then hit him and appeared to reach for a pistol, but
Stephenson then fired his own pistol.24 There is no evidence
that Father Coyle had a pistol.
II. THE PROSECUTION OF EDWIN STEPHENSON
After a grand jury returned an indictment against Stephen-
son on the charge of second-degree murder, the responsibility
for prosecuting the case rested with the circuit solicitor who had
presented the matter to the grand jury, while the Klan raised
funds for a team of five defense lawyers, four of whom were mem-
bers of the Klan.25 The exception was the lead defense attorney,
13. SuTrs, supra note 1, at 333.
14. Id. at 340; see also NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 71-72.
15. Suir-s, supra note 1, at 340; see also NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 72.
16. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 72.
17. Id. at 74.
18. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 73; see also SUTrs, supra note 1, at 339.
19. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 72.
20. Id.; see also SuiTTs, supra note 1, at 339.
21. Surrrs, supra note 1, at 339.
22. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 72.
23. Id. at 73.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 74.
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who was the former county solicitor.26 In the days following the
murder, Catholic friends of Father Coyle had hoped to employ
the services of the former county solicitor as a special prosecutor,
but his partner reached him first, on behalf of the defense of
Stephenson.27
There was animosity between the circuit solicitor and the
former county solicitor who would now represent Stephenson.
In 1916, the Legislature had consolidated county and circuit
solicitor offices, which created a power struggle between the Jef-
ferson County solicitor and the Birmingham circuit solicitor.21
The circuit solicitor won, and the popular county solicitor
entered a lucrative private practice. 29 "Rumors circulated that he
was planning to run for 'every office in the state from constable
to governor." 3 0
While he served as a county solicitor, Stephenson's attorney
had gained statewide notoriety as a crusader against bootleggers
in Girard, Alabama, now known as Phenix City, across the Chatta-
hoochee River from Columbus, Georgia.3 By the appointment
of the Attorney General of Alabama, the county solicitor had
obtained an indictment of a ring of bootleggers who then fled
the jurisdiction. 2 The county solicitor then obtained an order
of the destruction of more than half of a million dollars' worth of
whiskey and beer by pouring it into the streets of Girard, which
was reported with photographs on the front page of the Birming-
ham News, which called him the "man of the hour."33
Two important developments occurred before the trial.
First, the trial judge was changed from Judge Abernathy to judge
William Fort, an old friend of Stephenson's lead attorney.34 Sec-
ond, after he "took charge of the defense strategy,"35 Stephen-
son's lead attorney supplemented the earlier plea of not guilty by
reason of self-defense by adding a plea of not guilty by reason of
temporary insanity.36
According to [Birmingham] Press reports, this second line
of defense "would throw the gates wide open for introduc-
26. Id.
27. Id. at 71.
28. Id. at 46-47.
29. Surrrs, supra note 1, at 216-21.
30. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 48.
31. Id. at 44-45.
32. Id. at 45.
33. Id.; see also Surrrs, supra note 1, at 200-08.
34. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 74-75.
35. Id. at 74.
36. Su-rrrs, supra note 1, at 346.
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tion of testimony of the most varied nature" including testi-
mony about Stephenson's "views on Catholicism, his
alleged troubles with his daughter, his opposition to her
marriage, and the other things which, the defense may
claim, caused him to become temporarily insane.
37
The Stephenson trial started on October 17, 1921, and that
day the Birmingham News called it "the biggest criminal trial from
many angles ever held in Alabama. ' 38 The crowd of spectators
overflowed into the hallway. 39 Representatives of national news-
papers and wire services were present to report.
40
"The Klan was well represented at the trial."'" Not only were
four of the five defense lawyers members of the Klan, but the
trial judge, William Fort; the Birmingham police chief, Thomas
Shirley, who was a star witness for the defense; and most of the
jurors, including the foreman, were members of the Klan.42 The
police chief was even a national officer, and the jury foreman was
a field organizer.4 3 Two weeks before the trial, the Klan circu-
lated the list of the jury venire to check for Klan members.4 4
The prosecution never had a chance in a trial that was rid-
dled with appeals to racial and religious prejudice. The State
called only five witnesses in its case in chief, and from three of
the witnesses, Stephenson's attorney elicited, on cross-examina-
tion, that they were Catholics.45 For one of those witnesses, Ste-
phenson's attorney saved for his last question, "You are a
Catholic, aren't you?"'46 When the witness responded in the
affirmative, Stephenson's attorney ended with "[t]hat's all."
47
The climax of the defense attorney's appeal to religious big-
otry occurred during his closing argument when, after he
accused the State of injecting the religion of Father Coyle into
the trial, Stephenson's attorney made the following pitch:
Because a man becomes a priest does not mean that he is
divine. He has no more right to protection than a Protes-
37. Id. at 346-47.
38. VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 87 (citation omitted).
39. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 74.
40. Id. at 75.
41. Id. at 86.
42. Id.; see also VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 93.
43. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 86; VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, supra note 1,
at 93.
44. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 86.
45. Surrrs, supra note 1, at 348.
46. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 76. Newman states that Black, the lead
defense attorney, saved this question for last to ask three witnesses, but the trial
transcript shows that Black asked this question of one witness.
47. Id.
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tant minister. Who believes Ruth Stephenson has not been
proselytized? A child of a Methodist does not suddenly
depart from her religion unless someone has planted in
her mind the seeds of influence.
48
As one historian explained, "These were code words to ajury in a
southern, Protestant city like Birmingham in the 1920s."4 9 Ste-
phenson's attorney called prosecution witnesses "brothers of
falsehood as well as faith.
50
The most dramatic appeal to racial prejudice occurred dur-
ing the direct testimony of Stephenson. His lead attorney
wanted to bolster Stephenson's assertion that Pedro Gussman
appeared to be black, not Hispanic.5  Stephenson testified that
he told Coyle, "You have ruined my home. That man is a nig-
ger. ''52 During Stephenson's testimony, his attorney asked that
the blinds be drawn, and he arranged to have floodlights shone
on the face of Gussman The attorney then said, "That will
do.... I just wanted the jury to see that man. '54 After Gussman
testified that his parents were natives of Spain, Stephenson's
attorney showed the jury a newspaper photograph of Gussman. 5
Stephenson's attorney said, "I just wanted the jury to see this pic-
ture taken before the witness had his hair worked on.... You've
had the curls rubbed from your hair since you had that picture
taken. 56  In his closing argument, Stephenson's attorney
responded to the prosecution assertion that Gussman was of
"proud Castillian descent" by saying "he has descended a long
way."
5 7
The Klan left nothing in the trial to chance. "It was a rare
moment" when the ruling of the trial judge on an objection did
not favor the defense. 58 During his closing argument, Stephen-
son's attorney read from the official prayer of the Ku Klux
Klan.59 Klansmen in the courtroom communicated with hand
gestures.60 Years later, the head of the Klan in Alabama, who
raised the funds for the defense team, bragged that the defense
48. Id. at 83; VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 91.
49. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 83.
50. Id.; VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 90.
51. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 81.
52. Id. at 73; Surrrs, supra note 1, at 352.
53. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 81.
54. Id. at 82.
55. VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 89.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 90; NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 83.
58. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 77.
59. Id. at 83.
60. Id. at 86.
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"didn't have much trouble winning that verdict."' 61 After his
acquittal, Stephenson was given a seat of honor at Klan rallies
throughout Alabama, before he returned to his role as the mar-
rying parson.62 One historian has concluded that the Klan was
later successful in destroying all copies of the official trial tran-
script save for partial ones at the Cathedral of St. Paul and the
Archdiocese of Mobile.63
The most significant outcome of the trial was the assistance
it provided to the later career of Stephenson's lead attorney,
Hugo Lafayette Black. On September 13, 1923, Hugo Black, like
the other four members of his team before him, became a mem-
ber of the Klan.6 4 As one of his biographers described the event,
Black "placed his left hand over his heart, palm downward in a
fascist-like salute, raised his right straight to heaven, and
repeated the Klan oath," at a rally attended by a crowd of twenty-
five thousand.65 The Klan later became the center of a political
organization that elected Black to the U.S. Senate in 1926. He
became a populist New Dealer in the Southern tradition.66 In
1937, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed Hugo Black to be
an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
As I now enjoy the tremendous privilege of serving on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, my main cham-
bers are in Birmingham. It is a city that I love, and I have a
strong interest in the newly formed FatherJames Coyle Memorial
Project. It was formed in 2004 to mark the one-hundredth anni-
versary of Father Coyle's appointment as rector of St. Paul. My
first child was baptized at the Cathedral of St. Paul, and I often
attend Mass there; my family belongs to Our Lady of Sorrows
Church, where Stephenson's daughter, Ruth, became a Catholic;
and my high school alma mater in Mobile is the school where
Father Coyle, decades earlier, taught and served as rector. So
when I go to work each day in the Hugo Black courthouse and
see the bust of that judge in the rotunda, I cannot help but say
the prayer for Father Coyle that he used as the title of a poem:
"Requiescat in pace."6 7
61. Id.; VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 93.
62. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 88.
63. Id. at 87.
64. Id. at 91.
65. Id. at 92.
66. Id. at 195-204.
67. JAMES E. COYLE, Requiescat in pace, in ROSEMARY AND VIOLETS: POEMS 55
(1922) (published by friends of Father Coyle on the anniversary of his murder).
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III. A LESSON FROM HISTORY: THE CALLING OF A LAWYER
I do not offer this historical account to condemn the career
of Justice Black, whose service on the Supreme Court was, in sev-
eral respects, distinguished, but Black's representation of Ste-
phenson was not marked by professionalism and honor. Many of
Black's trial tactics were despicable, even evil. The lessons of
State v. Stephenson,68 without regard to the personalities involved,
are timeless.
A lawyer's call is not to win at any cost. Whether you can get
away with a tactic that might benefit your client is not the sole
measure of its propriety. Some winning tactics are simply wrong.
The true calling of a lawyer is noble, as expressed in the
Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer owes a duty of zealous
representation to his client, but that duty is tempered by moral
and ethical responsibilities. A lawyer must pursue meritorious
claims, but he must not abuse the legal process.69 An advocate
owes a duty of fairness to opposing counsel and parties.7 ° A law-
yer owes a duty of respect to the impartiality and decorum of the
court so that every case may be decided according to law.71 A
lawyer also owes respect to the rights of third persons.72
Through it all, a lawyer must maintain professional indepen-
dence as an officer of the court.
73
In addition to the questions raised about Black's trial tactics,
there is a debate among those who have studied the Stephenson
trial whether the prosecutors performed their ethical duty in
good faith. The conventional perspective, based on the opinion
of a newspaper reporter who witnessed the trial, is that the prose-
cutors did not want to obtain a conviction of Stephenson.74 A
student at the University of Alabama, in the law review comment
I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, last year challenged
that view and made a compelling argument, based on her review
of the transcripts of the grand jury and the trial and newspaper
reports, "that the Klan's reach stopped short of the Solicitor's
office.
75
What is clear is that the prosecutors had a special responsi-
bility in that trial: "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minis-
68. #1123-21 (Ala. Tri. Ct. 1921).
69. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.1 (2004).
70. Id. R. 3.4.
71. Id. R. 3.5.
72. Id. R. 4.4.
73. Id. R. 5.4.
74. NEwMAN, supra note 1, at 86.
75. Cowley, supra note 2, at 1146.
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ter of justice and not simply that of an advocate. '"76 The
prosecutor, above all, must seek the truth.
IV. MY RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISMS BY STEVE Surrrs
In June 2005, I spoke about this topic at a meeting of the St.
Thomas More Society in Atlanta, and the following month, Steve
Suitts, an author of a new biography of Hugo Black, wrote an op-
ed in a legal newspaper that condemned my account as "misjudg-
ing Hugo Black." 77 Apparently Mr. Suitts read an article about
my speech and concluded, without having read or requested the
entire speech, that I was "dead wrong: wrong facts, wrong ethics
and perhaps wrong motives."7" Suitts's biography had been pub-
lished a couple of months earlier, but I was not yet familiar with
it.
Despite my alleged errors, Suitts admitted, in his op-ed,
three key facts: (1) Black asked two witnesses at trial if they were
Catholic; (2) Black drew the courtroom blinds to show that
Pedro Gussman appeared to be a black man; and (3) Black ridi-
culed Gussman's ancestry.79 In his biography of Black, Suitts also
states that Black accused Gussman of having had curls removed
from his hair;"° Black elicited testimony from three, not two,
State witnesses that they were Catholic; Black argued in closing
that a priest is not divine or entitled to more protection than a
Protestant minister and Ruth Gussman had been wrongly
proselytized;8 2 and Black referred to two State witnesses as "'Sia-
mese twins' whose testimony was perjured simply because two
Catholic brothers believed their priest was a better man than
Stephenson."83
Suitts also reaches, in his new biography of Black, an uncon-
ventional conclusion about Black's membership in the Ku Klux
Klan.8 4 Suitts concludes that Black's membership in the Klan was
a decision of choosing the lesser of two evils, because the Klan
had been on what Suitts considers to have been the progressive
side of labor in disputes with corporate leaders of Birmingham. 5
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2004).
77. Steve Suitts, Op-Ed., Misjudging Hugo Black: Pryor Restraint Needed,
FULTON DAILY REP., July 18, 2005, at 10.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Suirrs, supra note 1, at 354.
81. Id. at 348.
82. Id. at 357.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 433.
85. Id. at 424-33.
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In Suitts's words, "Faced with a rough choice, Hugo Black pre-
ferred a Klan town to a company town."86 Suitts describes Black's
decision to join the Klan as governed by "ethics of responsibility
as well as conviction."87 He concludes, "Although, in retrospect,
his decision was a hazardous moral judgment in a misbegotten
society, Hugo Black did not suspend his moral compass when he
decided, once and for all, to become a Klansmen."
88
Suitts's disagreement with me and, more significantly, the
accounts of Hugo Black biographers Roger Newman and Vir-
ginia Van Der Veer Hamilton involves two matters: (1) whether
the Ku Klux Klan rigged Stephenson's trial; and (2) whether
Black's trial tactics were honorable. On both points, I find
Suitts's case unpersuasive. I will address each in turn.
Many of the Klan connections to the Stephenson trial
depend on the veracity of the Klan cyclops, James Esdale, who
told sources for years that the Klan rigged the trial.89 Esdale is
the source for members of the jury, including the foreman, being
members of the Klan; the pretrial circulation of the jury venire
list to check for Klan members; the Klan involvement in the
defense fund; the use of hand gestures by Klan members; and
Black's reference to the Klan prayer in his closing argument.9 ° If
Esdale told the truth about these matters, then it is fair to say that
the Klan rigged the trial.
Suitts speculates that, disbarred and "reduced to operating a
bail bond office, . . . [w]hen historians caught up with him,
beginning in the 1960s, Esdale had every temptation to rebuild
his self-esteem by remembering a past larger than life." 91 Suitts
concludes breathlessly, "No real evidence of Klan control exists
for this trial from sources other than Esdale."92 There are several
problems with Suitts's conclusion.
The first problem is that the Stephenson trial was consid-
ered to be rigged by the Klan long before the 1960s when Esdale,
according to Suitts's speculation, told tall tales. As Suitts admits
in an endnote of his book, as early as 1937, Esdale was the source
for what Suitts calls the "rumor" that Black repeated the Klan
prayer or oath in his closing argument.93 Suitts asserts that
"[t] here is no circumstantial or corroborating evidence for these
86. Id. at 432.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 83-84; Surrrs, supra note 1, at 359.
90. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 83-84.
91. Surrs, supra note 1, at 359.
92. Id.
93. Suirrs, supra note 1, at 579-80 n.42.
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claims, '9 4 but Suitts never acknowledges Roger Newman's
conclusion:
[so great was] the Klan's power at the time . . . that no
public record of the trial survives .... There is no record
of the case in the Jefferson County criminal courts.
Records of all other cases tried in 1921 remain. But that of
State v. Stephenson, #1123-21, was apparently destroyed, long
ago and almost certainly by the Klan.9 5
The only remaining trial transcripts are in the custody of the
Catholic Church in Alabama, and those transcripts do not have
the closing arguments for either the prosecution or the defense.
Other sources described the Stephenson trial as influenced
by the Klan long before the 1960s. In 1937, Ray Sprigle wrote an
article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette that described the Stephenson
trial as one with Klan connections and, in another article in
1949, Sprigle described a 'jury packed with Klansmen. '9 6 Both
Roger Newman and Virginia Hamilton relied on these articles in
their biographies of Black, but Suitts discounts the articles in
passing in another endnote of his book.
97
Although he asserts that there is "no real evidence" that the
Klan rigged the trial, Suitts admits in his book that "some of Ste-
phenson's lawyers and the Jefferson County sheriff were Klux-
ers."98 He does not state whether all of the defense lawyers,
except Black, were members of the Klan, as Newman concluded.
Suitts's reference to the sheriff appears to be about Thomas J.
Shirley, the Police Chief of Birmingham, who was an important
witness for Stephenson's defense, a national officer of the Klan,
and only later became the Sheriff of Jefferson County.99 Suitts
admits that five years after the trial, one of the jurors became an
"Alabama Klan official," and "a decade later, one of Stephenson's
character witnesses was a Kluxer in Virginia."1 °  Suitts even
admits that there is evidence that the trial judge, William Fort,
later became a Klansman; 1° ' but Ray Sprigle reported in 1937
that Judge Fort "presided over a Klan meeting" in June after the
Stephenson trial, 0 2 which would suggest that Fort was a member
well before then. Suitts also does not mention the parading of
94. Id.
95. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 87 n.*.
96. SuITrs, supra note 1, at 579 n.41.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 360.
99. Id. at 350; NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 72, 79, 86, 91.
100. SuIrrs, supra note 1, at 359-60.
101. Id. at 360.
102. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 86 n.*.
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Reverend Stephenson at Klan rallies following his acquittal. Per-
haps these facts and omissions explain why Suitts asserts in an
endnote, "The counting of Kluxer connections is a misguided,
misleading exercise for evidencing Klan involvement or control
in a trial."' 3
Some of Suitts's downplaying of the potential Klan involve-
ment in the Stephenson trial is hard to comprehend. Suitts
asserts, for example, "[D]espite a general history of Klan illegal-
ity, no evidence suggests that in 1921 most Kluxers in Birming-
ham were willing to ignore their lawful duty in a courtroom."104
Suitts does not mention the conclusion of Newman that "[i] n the
early 1920s the Klan controlled Birmingham. . . . Juries domi-
nated by the Klan 'routinely' acquitted members or sympathizers
of 'a variety of crimes, the only requirement being that the victim
must have been (a) Negro, (b) Catholic, (c) an immigrant, (d)
or an idle boozer."'
10 5
Later in his book, in reference to another trial in Birming-
ham in 1923, Suitts makes a fine distinction between "bias" and
"a rigged jury.'10 6 Suitts states that the Dowling trial in 1923 sug-
gested "some Kluxers seemed Willing to stand behind their breth-
ren in court despite evidence of guilt."'0 7 He then explains that
one of the reasons Hugo Black joined the Klan was "to make
certain that opposing lawyers did not get the upper hand with
Klansmen on the juries simply because they were fraternal broth-
ers."10'  Suitts then reasons, "If a juror believed a fellow
Klansmen more truthful than someone else, no specific law was
violated by that act of personal judgment."' 0 9 I submit that a trial
where the accused is a Klansmen, some members of the jury are
Klansmen, and the victim is a Catholic immigrant is unfair
regardless of Suitts's distinction between a biased jury and a
rigged trial.
The final theory of Suitts that the Klan did not rig the Ste-
phenson trial rests on two propositions. First, Suitts asserts that
the Klan was not yet a powerful organization in Birmingham in
1921. As evidence for that proposition, Suitts states, without fur-
ther explanation, that a Klan Wizard said in January of that year
that the membership rolls had only 1600 in a county of
103. Suirrs, supra note 1, at 580 n.43.
104. Id.
105. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 90-91.
106. Sur-rs, supra note 1, at 425.
107. Id. For a description of the Dowling trial, see id. at 580 n.45.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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310,000,110 but Suitts fails to mention that, in contrast with
Klansmen, a substantial majority (at least eighty percent) of the
total population of Jefferson County were women, blacks, immi-
grants, minors, and others who were ineligible for service on a
jury.,
l1
The trial also occurred nine months later in October, and
even Suitts admits in his book that the growth of the Klan in the
early 1920s was "phenomenal."1 12 The most authoritative history
of Alabama states, "By 1920 anti-Catholicism was rampant, and
the Ku Klux Klan exercised tremendous influence."' 1 3 Newman
explains, in his biography of Black, that, after Esdale became a
Klan recruiter in 1920, Esdale "quickly built the membership up
to several thousand.""' 4 Newman also concluded,
In the early 1920s the Klan controlled Birmingham.
White-robed men and cross burnings; whippings and lash-
ings; floggings and abductions; tarrings, featherings and
brandings; flashing lights into parked cars, closing dance
halls and beating people in the name of morality-all were
common sights in the Magic City. . . . [Citizens] were
urged to patronize only those shops whose windows dis-
played T.W.K. (Trade With a Klansman) signs.' 15
Suitts's theory is also at odds with a respected history of the
Alabama Klan in the early twentieth century. 1 16 Professor Glenn
110. Id. at 360.
111. In 1921, an Alabama statute categorically excluded women and all
persons under twenty-one and over sixty years of age. ALA. CODE § 7239 (1907).
The statute also provided considerable leeway for commissioners to exclude
members of other classes by charging commissioners to select potential jurors
"as in [the commissioners's] opinion are fit and competent to discharge the
duties of grand and petit jurors with honesty, impartiality, and intelligence, and
are esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character, and sound
judgment." Id. As the Alabama Supreme Court stated, jurors in Alabama were
"a selected class," Green v. State, 73 Ala. 26, 41-42 (1882), and jury commission-
ers in Alabama and throughout the South in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury selected potential jurors who were almost always white. See, e.g., Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590-91, 593 (1935); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:
THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for
Equality 149, 223 (Vintage Books ed. 2004) (1976); FRANK T. READ & Lucy S.
McGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP
SOUTH 323, 329 (1978). Suitts provides no reason to think that, in 1921, white
Klansmen would not have served on juries in Jefferson County in numbers far
exceeding their percentage of the overall population.
112. Surrs, supra note 1, at 360.
113. ROGERS ET AL., supra note 1, at 448.
114. NEwMAN, supra note 1, at 90.
115. Id. at 90-91.
116. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 58-59.
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Feldman of the University of Alabama at Birmingham describes
the operation of an active Klan in Birmingham even before 1920,
and he states that the activities of the Klan were certainly hostile
to the Catholic Church.1 1 7 He explains that in 1916 the Klan
burned a Catholic church and school in Pratt City, and
"Klansmen encouraged people to boycott stores with Catholic
owners or employees, pressured businesses to fire their Catholic
employees, and protested the construction of one church simply
because it was Catholic." 8 Feldman also explains that these
activities of the Klan coincided with the success of politicians run-
ning anti-Catholic campaigns for the Birmingham city commis-
sion in 1917 and the governorship of Alabama in 1919.19
Suitts's second proposition is that another and better estab-
lished anti-Catholic organization called the True Americans was
more likely "lurking in the shadows" of the Stephenson trial, but
he writes "even they were not an all-pervasive, secret society that
could easily fix a jury verdict in Alabama's largest county."1 2
Suitts's speculation about the True Americans, which no mem-
ber of that group ever revealed, tells us nothing about whether
the Klan was involved, but the existence of the True Americans
evidences that Birmingham was a community infected by bigotry
against Catholics. That bigotry also explains, in part, why I con-
tinue to disagree with Suitts's view that "by man's justice [Ste-
phenson] was not clearly guilty." '12 1
That brings me to Suitts's criticism of my description of
Black's trial tactics as dishonorable, even evil. Suitts concludes in
his book:
If Black's methods in pursuing this defense offend modern
sensibilities and standards, they were not outside the
bounds of courtroom tactics during the early 1920s nor
were they questioned at any time by prosecutors who failed
to object even when Black pulled the courtroom blinds to
darken Gussman's appearance.... In a society sustained by
the fear of interracial marriage, the use of Gussman's phys-
ical appearance was relevant, plausible, and potentially
explosive in pursuing a claim of temporary insanity-and




119. Id. at 59.
120. Suirrs, supra note 1, at 360.
121. Id. at 365.
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In his op-ed about my perspective, Suitts challenged my view
that a lawyer must measure his work based on standards of moral-
ity. Suitts wrote:
Perhaps it is not surprising that Pryor, a devout Catholic
from Mobile, would repeat the incorrect conventional wis-
dom of a footnote in the Catholic Church's annals of relig-
ious bigotry, but his hyperbole about Black as an example
of evil is a disturbing view about a lawyer's ethics. Pryor
suggests that criminal defense lawyers have a higher calling
than to use "a tactic that might benefit your client .. " As
Black knew well and Pryor ought to appreciate, when trial
lawyers start measuring their duty in court by standards
other than representing their own clients, to the best of
their ability, within the legitimate rules of the courtroom,
the American legal system begins to fail. 2 '
I reject Suitts's criticism on two grounds. First, Hugo Black's
trial tactics were objectively wrong. Second, Suitts's model of a
lawyer guided by moral relativism is not likely to serve well the
American legal system. Allow me to explain.
Leaving aside what Suitts calls the "incorrect conventional
wisdom" that Hugo Black was involved in a Klan conspiracy to rig
the Stephenson trial, there is still plenty of reason to criticize
Black's blatant appeals to racial and religious bigotry during the
trial. After he murdered Father Coyle, Stephenson immediately
walked to the courthouse and told a law enforcement officer that
he should be put in jail because he was "in trouble."'1 24 Stephen-
son then told interrogators that "[i] t was purely a case of self-
defense."'125 The defense that Stephenson was not guilty by rea-
son of insanity was concocted after Hugo Black became
involved. 126 Suitts writes in his book that "Black devised [the]
legal strategy," 127 which allowed the use of appeals to racial and
religious bigotry. According to Suitts, "[A]n Alabama jury of
white men in 1921 could easily believe that a fundamentalist
white Methodist minister would go 'crazy' if he discovered sud-
denly that his only daughter, who had flirted with Catholicism,
converted and married a Negro man.' 1 28 The most fundamental
123. Suitts, supra note 77, at 10.
124. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 73; Surrrs, supra note 1, at 340.
125. Suirrs, supra note 1, at 340.
126. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 74-75; Suirrs, supra note 1, at 361-62.
127. Suirrs, supra note 1, at 361.
128. Id. at 361-62.
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problem with this theory is that it was false, but Hugo Black did
not care whether it was false.
129
Hugo Black, Reverend Stephenson, and many others must
have either known or strongly suspected that Pedro Gussman was
not black. In all of the Birmingham newspaper reports of the
Coyle murder and the Stephenson trial that I can find, every ref-
erence to the race of Pedro Gussman states that he was a Puerto
Rican. I cannot find a single article in the mainstream press
from this era of segregation and extreme race consciousness that
refers to Pedro Gussman as a Negro.
Had anyone thought that Gussman was black, the response
would have been severe. Recall that in 1921, an interracial mar-
riage was more than abhorrent; it was illegal. If Stephenson
thought that Coyle had performed an illegal wedding, then the
obvious response would have been to report the priest to the
police and have the marriage declared void. There is also little
reason to believe that either Father Coyle or Stephenson's
daughter, Ruth, would have wanted anything to do with a crimi-
nal marriage of a white woman and a black man in Alabama in
1921.
Although this defense was false, Hugo Black did not care to
prove its truth. Hugo Black wanted to change the subject of the
trial from an implausible argument of self-defense to a terror
about race and religion. Whether other Alabama lawyers would
have employed this tactic in 1921 is beside the point. There are
plenty of aspects of the Alabama legal system then that were evil,
including the exclusion of women and blacks from the jury
venire. It was one thing for a lawyer to represent his client in a
flawed system of justice, but it was something else to rely either
deliberately or recklessly on a falsehood to make the defense an
appeal to bigotry.
Suitts speculates in his op-ed that perhaps my real motiva-
tion for speaking about the Stephenson trial has to do with dis-
crediting Black because of his church and state jurisprudence,
but my motivation was exactly what I have already explained: that
is, because of several personal coincidences, I find this bit of his-
tory fascinating. Had Suitts read my entire speech, he would
have known that I said I have no interest in condemning Black. I
find Black's courage in signing the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,13 0 for example, to be admirable, as well as his adher-
ence to text in constitutional interpretation. I have no doubt
129. I am grateful to Dean Sharon Davies for her insights about whether
Black believed Gussman was a Negro. Any errors in this analysis are mine.
130. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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that Black was an outstanding trial lawyer who represented his
clients superbly.
But I will admit that I do not view Hugo Black as a role
model. I do not sympathize with Suitts's defense of Black's deci-
sion to join the Klan. I also am not an admirer of either Black's
deep-seated hostility to the Catholic Church or his liberal popu-
list career as a politician.
At the end of the day, I still believe that a lawyer or judge is
morally accountable for his professional work. In 1921, the Code
of Ethics for Alabama lawyers acknowledged, "The attorney's
office does not destroy a man's accountability to the Crea-
tor . . .."' Thirteen years before the Stephenson trial, the
American Bar Association stated in Canon 32 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics the lawyer's final duty: "[H]e advances the
honor of his profession and the best interests of his client when
he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the
client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles of moral law."' 32
It is easy to say, with the hindsight of eighty years, that the
tactics of the Stephenson defense team were wrong, but we
should not deceive ourselves with the belief that the temptation
to corrupt the rule of law has been since eliminated. That temp-
tation will always be with us. The question is how well will we
avoid it.
I reject Suitts's view that we will avoid well future tempta-
tions by having lawyers employ situational ethics in the represen-
tation of clients. Lawyers and judges must adhere to their
professional responsibilities, but that adherence does not require
any compromise of conscience. The legal system will be better
served by having lawyers and judges remember that their calling
is a moral enterprise.
When Catholic lawyers and judges confront evil in our fallen
world, we are called to follow the example of our role model and
patron saint, Sir Thomas More. After King Henry VIII left his
wife, Catherine, for relations with Anne Boleyn, and the clergy
surrendered the property of the Church in England to the King,
St. Thomas More resigned as Lord Chancellor. When the
English parliament passed the Act of Succession, which made
Anne Boleyn's issue first in succession to the Crown, St. Thomas
More said he would swear to the succession for it was the law of
131. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 86-87.
132. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 32 (1908), reprinted in
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITy 15 (6th ed. 1995).
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the land, but he refused to declare the supremacy of the King
over the Church. More recognized clearly his duty to render to
God what belongs to Him, while rendering to Caesar what
belongs to him.133 As More succincdy explained a moment
before his execution, he "died the King's good servant and God's
first." 4 We should strive to follow More's example.
133. Matthew 22:18-22.
134. JOHN FARRow, THE STORY OF THOMAS MORE 227 (1954); Matthew
Mehan, Getting to Know Thomas More, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 25, 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/mehan20050825082 4. asp.
